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Note
Toward a Robust Separation of Powers:
Recapturing the Judiciary’s Role at Sentencing
Hans H. Grong∗
Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator.
—James Madison1
American criminal law has expanded dramatically over the
last fifty years.2 What began as a legislative attempt to codify
the common law definitions of crimes quickly shifted into an
expansive and detailed criminal law system.3 During the evolution of this area of law, the allocation of power between the
three branches—particularly on the issues of defining crimes
and sentencing individuals—shifted from a system based on
judicial discretion within broad legislative parameters toward a
system based on required judicial deference to broad legislative
authority to define crimes as well as determine individual sentences.4
This Note argues that the Supreme Court’s recent sentencing jurisprudence has missed the mark by focusing too heavily
on the individual rights provisions of the Sixth Amendment
∗ J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2005,
Macalester College. I wish to thank Professor Stephen Cribari for his invaluable guidance and revisions; Claire Deason, David Biggs, and Jeffrey Justman
for their entertainment; and Kevin O’Riordan for his encouragement throughout this process. I wish to offer a special thank you to David and Linda Grong
for their unwavering support over the years. Copyright © 2008 by Hans H.
Grong.
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 310 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano
ed., 2000) (quoting Charles de Secondat Montesquieu) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
2. See Ian Weinstein, The Revenge of Mullaney v. Wilbur: United States
v. Booker and the Reassertion of Judicial Limits on Legislative Power to Define
Crimes, 84 OR. L. REV. 393, 397 (2005).
3. See id. at 396–97.
4. See id. at 395–96.
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and Due Process Clause at the expense of the structural concerns of the separation of powers. The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (Guidelines) violate the separation of powers, and
the Court’s jurisprudence has failed to address the problem. In
its rush to ingrain the jury in the criminal process, the Court
has missed the forest for the trees. The cases not only sort out
the procedural requirements of the criminal process, but also
the optimal balance of power between each branch of government.
Which branch of government has what power in the criminal process? This is the unstated question in the Court’s sentencing cases. Congress’s 1984 approval of the Guidelines was
the most systematic and sweeping accumulation of power within the criminal process in the history of the Nation. The Court
made multiple attempts to cure the constitutional violations resulting from Congress’s action, but the analytic framework
proved insufficient. Until the Court changes its analysis and
recognizes the separation of powers concerns that underlie the
current system, the Guidelines will continue to exert unacceptable legislative influence over the sentencing process.
Part I of this Note provides the social, legislative, and judicial history of the Guidelines and discusses the Supreme
Court’s conventional individual rights approach to criminal
procedure. Part II analyzes the intersection between the separation of powers doctrine and the Guidelines, concluding that
the Guidelines are a per se violation of the separation of powers. Part III proposes that the Court declare the Guidelines unconstitutional in their current form, but allow Congress the
choice between complete invalidation of the Guidelines or requiring that all elements relevant to the Guidelines sentence be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
The history of the Guidelines is a culmination of social, political, and judicial developments that occurred over the past
half century. This Part lays out the developments that led to
the current approach to sentencing. It begins by examining
America’s traditional approach as well as the social and political transformations that uprooted the traditional system. It
then examines the legislative history of the Guidelines as well
as their practical application. Finally, this Part reviews the Su-
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preme Court’s approach to the criminal process and sentencing
in particular.
A. FEDERAL SENTENCING: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Traditionally, scholars read the Constitution as separating
the legislature’s role of defining criminal activity, the executive’s role of enforcing criminal prohibitions, the jury’s role of
adjudicating guilt, and the judiciary’s role of sentencing the
convicted.5 The distinctions between defining, executing, adjudicating, and sentencing are at the heart of America’s criminal
jurisprudence and the framers’ constitutional structure.6
This conception of separated power informed and defined
the sentencing structure prior to 1984. On one hand, the legislature had nearly unfettered discretion to define the substantive aspects of the criminal law.7 Within the confines of the
Constitution,8 the legislature was free to define crimes as it
saw fit to promote its policies.9 The furthest that the legislature
would reach into sentencing was the enactment of a maximum
sentence for a crime.10 The legislature exercised no control over
the sentence imposed on any individual defendant.11
5. See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 2 (1998) (“In the American constitutional
tradition, there has heretofore been a formal distinction between the process of
crime definition (the responsibility of the legislative branch) and the process of
criminal sentencing within the maximum penalties provided by statute (the
responsibility of the judiciary . . . ).”).
6. See Jackie Gardina, Compromising Liberty: A Structural Critique of
the Sentencing Guidelines, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 345, 378–82 (2005) (demonstrating that jury adjudication was a structural requirement in line with
the separation of powers); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels
Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers
Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 463–65 (1991) (describing the rationale for the traditional tripartite separation of powers under the Constitution).
7. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 22.
8. The Constitution places structural, procedural, and substantive limits
on Congress’s ability to define crimes. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3
(“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”).
9. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 479 (“‘[L]egislative’ power includes only the authority to promulgate generalized standards and requirements of citizen behavior or to dispense benefits—to achieve, maintain, or
avoid particular social policy results.”).
10. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 9; Louis F. Oberdorfer, Lecture, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge’s Perspective—2002, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 11, 14 (2003).
11. See Oberdorfer, supra note 10, at 14 (describing the role the legislature played in sentencing prior to the Guidelines as limited to prescribing a
“maximum, but not any minimum, sentence”).
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On the other hand, the judiciary exercised broad discretion
at sentencing.12 Once a jury decided the elements of a particular crime had been proven, the judge imposed on the defendant
any sentence up to the statutory maximum.13 Not only was the
sentence committed to the discretion of the judge, the decision
was final.14 For the majority of the twentieth century, this system of indeterminate sentencing was the norm not only in the
federal system, but also in the states.15
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL SENTENCING: 1970–
PRESENT
This Section describes the shift away from the traditional
model as a two-step process. The first step was the growth of
social and political dissatisfaction with the traditional model’s
results.16 The second was Congress’s dramatic solution to the
perceived problem—the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.17
1. Social and Political Developments of the 1970s
In the 1970s, both legislators and judges questioned the
rehabilitative penal philosophy underlying the discretionary
sentencing structure.18 The “severe sentencing disparity among

12. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 9 (“From the beginning of the
Republic, federal judges were entrusted with wide sentencing discretion.”).
13. See id.
14. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6 (1996) (“For all practical purposes, appellate review of sentences . . . was nonexistent.”).
15. Id. at 4 (“In 1970, every state and the federal system had an ‘indeterminate sentencing system’ in which judges had wide discretion to decide who
went to prison and to set maximum and sometimes minimum prison terms.”).
16. See Oberdorfer, supra note 10, at 14 (“In the early 1970s, public outrage about increasing violent crime was growing; Congress and state legislatures were listening. From one segment of public opinion came complaints
that some judges were too lenient . . . . From another segment came complaints that sentences were too long . . . .”).
17. Technically, the Guidelines are a product of the United States Sentencing Commission. Congress, however, created the Commission with the express purpose of enacting the Guidelines. This Note glosses over this distinction because, although fascinating, it is not relevant to the issue discussed
here. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 324–25 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“The fact that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are promulgated
by an administrative agency . . . is irrelevant . . . . The Guidelines have the
force of law . . . .”).
18. See TONRY, supra note 14, at 13 (discussing the rise of “just deserts”
as the dominant penal philosophy after the rejection of rehabilitation). See
generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
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similarly situated defendants” eroded support for judicial discretion.19 Research indicated that sentences for identical crimes
varied by up to seventeen years.20 The underlying issue, however, was not the disparity in and of itself but, rather, the correlation between disparate sentences and factors such as race.21
Reformers claimed judicial discretion was to blame for the disparate sentences.22
In response, Congress completely overhauled the sentencing system23 by “divest[ing] the independent Federal judiciary
of the power to determine criminal sentences.”24 The shift of
sentencing authority away from the independent judiciary was
one of the most revolutionary developments of the criminal justice system in the last century.25 The Sentencing Manual replaced the discretion that the framers entrusted to the federal
judiciary, which had existed for two hundred years of American
legal history.26

REV. 223 (1993) (providing a useful history of the political run-up to the Sentencing Reform Act).
19. Gardina, supra note 6, at 354.
20. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1988) (detailing the motivations behind the Guidelines push). But see STITH & CABRANES,
supra note 5, at 106–12 (questioning the validity of research on disparity).
21. See Breyer, supra note 20, at 5. Disparity between the sentences given
to individual defendants is not inappropriate unless it is based on an irrelevant factor. See Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American
Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 528–29 (2007) (“Disparity
inheres in any system that seeks to provide proportional punishment, that tailors the punishment to fit, not just the crime, but the criminal, and that purports to be a national system.”).
22. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 17 (explaining the perceived
incompatibility of judicial discretion with the “new rehabilitation model” of
incarceration); Stith & Koh, supra note 18, at 228–29 (discussing the continuing and forceful criticism levied by Judge Marvin E. Frankel—a federal district judge in New York—against the judicial discretion model). Congress was
concerned about what would become known as the “‘unjustifiably wide’ sentencing disparity.” Breyer, supra note 20, at 4.
23. See Gardina, supra note 6, at 355 (“Congress enacted sweeping sentencing reform that dramatically altered the way in which defendants convicted in federal court were sentenced.”).
24. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 1.
25. Id. at 2 (“The transfer of formal sentencing authority from federal
judges to the Sentencing Commission is probably the most significant development in judging in the federal judicial system since the adoption in 1938 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
26. See id. at 1.
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2. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) accomplished
this legislative reform of the sentencing system.27 It was
enacted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984.28 According to Stephen Breyer, Congress contemplated
“two primary purposes” for the SRA.29 Honesty in sentencing
was the first;30 the SRA eliminated parole as an option in sentencing and punishment.31 Reduction of the sentencing disparity was the second purpose.32 The SRA attempted to achieve this
goal through two separate means: the creation of appellate review of sentences,33 and the establishment of the United States
Sentencing Commission (Commission) to promulgate sentencing guidelines.34 In hindsight, the combined effect of the elimination of parole and the creation of appellate review of sentences has paled in comparison to the effect of the
Commission.35
On November 1, 1987, the United States Sentencing
Guidelines took effect.36 The Guidelines are based on a chart or
grid. The nature of the offense is on one axis and the defendant’s criminal history is on the other.37 The box in which these
two categories intersect in the Sentencing Table dictates the
permissible sentence.38 The Guidelines are a legislative oddity;
they have the force of law but are not attached to any particu-

27. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98
Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). See
generally Stith & Koh, supra note 18 (discussing the politics leading up to the
SRA).
28. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1976.
29. See Breyer, supra note 20, at 4; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra
note 5, at 2 (“The 1984 Act sought to achieve ‘certainty and fairness’ in the
federal sentencing process by eliminating ‘unwarranted disparity’ among sentences for similar defendants committing similar offenses.”).
30. Breyer, supra note 20, at 4.
31. See Sentencing Reform Act § 3624.
32. See Breyer, supra note 20, at 4.
33. See Sentencing Reform Act § 3742.
34. See Sentencing Reform Act § 991.
35. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 2.
36. Id. at 1.
37. See Gardina, supra note 6, at 357. The nature of the offense is determined by taking the base level offense and adding or subtracting levels based
on predetermined factors. See id. The defendant’s criminal history is also adjusted according to predetermined factors. See id.
38. Id.
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lar crime.39 Until 2005, when the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker,40 the Guidelines effectively left the judge
little or no power to sentence outside of this predetermined
range.41 The courts began hearing challenges to the constitutionality of this novel system almost immediately.42
C. JUDICIAL APPROACH TO SENTENCING
This Section details the Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence. It describes the cases prior to the enactment of the
Guidelines and highlights the development of the individual
rights analysis. It then discusses the cases that, either directly
or indirectly, affected the Guidelines as well as the analysis
used to decide the cases. This Section focuses on the Court’s use
of the individual rights provisions of the Sixth Amendment as
the core constitutional challenge and method of analysis relating to the Guidelines.
1. Pre-Guidelines Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence traces back
to In re Winship.43 The narrow issue presented was whether
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required when adjudicating juvenile cases.44 The Court emphatically concluded that,
whether juvenile or adult, the Due Process Clause requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt for every element of the crime
charged.45 Despite the simplicity of the Court’s command, this
case touched off a barrage of legislative and judicial activity attempting to define not only what constitutes an element of a

39. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1A1.1, 1B1.6 (2007)
(describing the authority under which the Guidelines are set forth and the organization and structure of the Guidelines).
40. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
41. See Gardina, supra note 6, at 357.
42. See Stith & Koh, supra note 18, at 281 (“Since they were promulgated
in 1987, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been the subject of considerable attention, receiving little praise and much criticism from the legal community.”).
43. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
44. Id. at 359.
45. Id. at 364 (“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he
is charged.”).
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crime, but also which branch of government has the power to
provide such a definition.46
Mullaney v. Wilbur47 was the Court’s first attempt at dealing with the issues raised in the wake of In re Winship. It indicated that the Court was unwilling to allow state legislatures to
circumvent In re Winship.48 The issue presented was whether
Maine could utilize a rebuttable presumption of malice aforethought in cases where intentional, unlawful killing had been
proven.49 Relying on In re Winship, the Court held that, because malice aforethought was a defined element of the crime
of murder, Maine could not shift the burden of proof to the defendant.50 Instead, as in In re Winship, the Due Process Clause
required Maine to prove malice aforethought beyond a reasonable doubt.51
Beginning with In re Winship and Mullaney, the pendulum
of criminal sentencing power rested squarely on the side of jury
adjudication and judicial sentencing discretion.52 As a result of
the societal and political issues during the late 1970s and early
1980s, the pendulum quickly swung toward legislative intervention in all aspects of the criminal process.53 Patterson v.
New York54 and McMillan v. Pennsylvania55 demonstrated how
firmly entrenched the legislature was in all aspects of the criminal process.56
In Patterson, the Court dealt with a statute nearly identical to the one at issue in Mullaney.57 The only difference was
46. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 83–87 (1986) (distinguishing between sentencing factors and elements); Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197, 208–211 (1977) (discussing the need for certain elements in common
law crimes); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692–704 (1975) (discussing the
use of presumptions in elements).
47. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
48. See id. at 698.
49. Id. at 684–87.
50. Id. at 704.
51. Id.
52. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 403 (discussing the system of broad
judicial discretion in place prior to Patterson v. New York).
53. See id. at 413 (“[U]nfettered judicial sentencing discretion gave way to
a variety of legislatively imposed reviewable sentencing requirements . . . .”).
54. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
55. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
56. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 413 (describing McMillan as a triumph
of the legislature over the judiciary for control of the sentencing process).
57. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 198 (describing the New York murder statute as including only two elements—the intent to cause the death of another
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New York’s decision to remove malice aforethought from the
definition of murder, yet allow it as an affirmative defense.58
Unlike Mullaney, the Court upheld the conviction under New
York’s statute.59 Since malice aforethought was not an element
of the crime, the Court reasoned, In re Winship’s holding was
satisfied.60 In a dissent that foreshadowed Apprendi v. New
Jersey,61 Justice Lewis Powell argued that the Court ignored
the underlying issue by allowing the legislature to undefine
crimes and circumvent the due process requirements of In re
Winship.62
Despite the seismic shift of power recognized in Patterson,
the constitutional issues at play were due process and the Sixth
Amendment. It was a matter of how the legislature defined
crimes and the implications of that decision for the rights of individual defendants. It did not implicate the separation of powers because the legislature had not yet co-opted the judge’s
power to determine an individual sentence.63
McMillan v. Pennsylvania64 completed the shift towards
legislative power. The case involved a challenge to a Pennsylvania statute that required the mandatory imposition of a fiveyear minimum sentence if the sentencing judge concluded, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the crime was committed
while visibly possessing a firearm.65 Visible possession of a
firearm was not a statutorily defined element of the underlying
crime but, rather, a fact to be determined at sentencing according to an independent statute.66 Relying on the logic of Patterperson, and actually causing the death of another person—and not including
malice aforethought as an element).
58. Id. at 212–13 (distinguishing Maine’s murder statute from the one at
issue in Patterson by showing that Maine’s statute defined murder as unlawful killing with malice aforethought).
59. Id. at 216.
60. Id. at 215–16.
61. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
62. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 228 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The Winship/Mullaney test indentifies those factors of such importance, historically, in
determining punishment and stigma that the Constitution forbids shifting to
the defendant the burden of persuasion when such a factor is at issue.”).
63. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 411 (“This broad legislative power to
define crimes was counterbalanced by broad judicial sentencing
discretion . . . .”).
64. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
65. Id. at 83.
66. See id. at 81. The Pennsylvania statute at issue was a sentencing statute dealing with crimes committed while in possession of a firearm. It provided (at the time McMillan was decided), in effect, that certain felonies, de-
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son, the Court concluded that visibly possessing a firearm was
a “sentencing factor,” and as such, the sentence did not violate
the due process requirements of In re Winship.67 The distinction between an element of a crime and a “sentencing factor”
was premised on the notion that the firearm provision did not
increase the statutorily determined punishment range, but rather limited the sentencing judge’s discretion within that statutory range by imposing a minimum sentence.68
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that there
must be a meaningful distinction between aggravating and mitigating factors.69 Based on that distinction, Pennsylvania’s
statute was unconstitutional because it allowed an unproven
fact to aggravate the sentence.70 As a counterpoint, the legislature could define crimes extremely broadly but allow the defendant to prove mitigating factors, similar to Patterson.71
The Court focused exclusively on individual rights rather
than structural concerns.72 In re Winship’s individual rights
concerns were satisfied because the Court concluded that the
firearms provision was a sentencing factor rather than an element of the crime.73 The Court remained silent on the separation of powers issue because it was not raised as part of the
challenge. Despite McMillan’s individual rights focus, the first
challenge to the Guidelines nevertheless dealt with the separation of powers.
fined in other sections of the Code, were punishable by a minimum of five
years in prison if committed while in possession of a firearm. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9712 (1982). The statutes defining the crimes made no mention of the
mandatory minimum sentences. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85–86. The fact
that the defendant possessed a firearm was not proven to the jury. See id. at
82.
67. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86 (“While visible possession might well have
been included as an element of the enumerated offenses . . . Patterson teaches
that we should hesitate to conclude that Due Process bars the State from pursuing its chosen course in the area of defining crimes . . . .”).
68. Id. at 87–88.
69. Id. at 100 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 103–04.
71. Id. at 99.
72. See id. at 90 (majority opinion) (discussing the due process requirements and concluding that due process does not require certain facts to be
proved simply because many states require such proof ).
73. See id. at 87–88 (“Section 9712 neither alters the maximum penalty
for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate
penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court’s discretion in selecting
a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of
visible possession of a firearm.” (emphasis added)).
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2. Judicial Interpretation of the Guidelines
In 1989, the Court decided Mistretta v. United States,74 the
first challenge to the validity of the Guidelines. The questions
presented were whether Congress’s delegation of power to the
Commission was excessive, and whether the creation of the
Commission violated the separation of powers doctrine.75 The
Court answered both questions negatively and upheld the delegation of power.76 Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a scathing lone
dissent, arguing that the Commission—comprised of members
of the executive and judicial branches—was exercising legislative power by effectively defining crimes.77 Mistretta was the
only time that the Court has been faced with a separation of
powers challenge to the Guidelines.78 The Court looked only at
the alleged judicial involvement in legislating instead of dealing with the issue broadly. It did not address the legislature’s
involvement in individual sentencing.
Having decided the delegation and separation of powers issues in Mistretta, the Court returned to the individual rights
analysis developed from In re Winship to McMillan. Jones v.
United States79 foreshadowed the application of that analysis to
the Guidelines. The Court’s decisions in Jones and Apprendi v.
New Jersey80 signaled that the judicial branch was finally willing to push back against the legislative encroachment that became entrenched in Patterson and McMillan.81
A federal car-jacking statute was at issue in Jones.82 The
narrow question presented was one of statutory interpretation—whether the statute “defined three distinct offenses or a
74. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
75. Id. at 371–72; see also Mark Nielsen, Mistretta v. United States and
the Eroding Separation of Powers, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1049, 1049
(1989).
76. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 412.
77. Id. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the Commission as a “junior-varsity Congress”). Justice Scalia argued that the Commission violated
the separation of powers because it was exercising legislative power. Id. at
426–27.
78. Cf. Nielsen, supra note 75, at 1055 (“The Court viewed Mistretta’s separation-of-powers claim as containing three distinct arguments—the first
emphasizing the Commission’s location, the second its composition, and the
third its potential vulnerability to executive control.”).
79. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
80. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
81. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 426–27 (arguing that Jones and Apprendi signaled a move back towards the Mullaney framework).
82. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229.
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single crime with a choice of three maximum penalties, two of
them dependent on sentencing factors exempt from the requirements of charge and jury verdict.”83 Justice David Souter—joined by Justices Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, and Stevens—concluded that the former was the
proper interpretation.84
The relevant aspect of Jones, however, was not the holding
of the case but, rather, the reasoning Justice Souter used to
reach that decision. He argued that the latter interpretation
would raise serious Sixth Amendment and due process concerns.85 Relying on the analysis stemming from In re Winship,
Justice Souter argued that removing facts that increase punishment from the jury’s consideration is inconsistent with the
Sixth Amendment and due process.86 In the wake of Patterson
and McMillan, Jones breathed new life into the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause arguments as they related to the
Guidelines.87
Similar to Jones, the Court’s decision in Apprendi was important to the Guidelines but did not deal with them directly.
At issue was a due process claim arising out of a sentence under a New Jersey hate crimes statute.88 The question presented
was whether a judge—sitting without a jury at sentencing—
could impose a sentence above the maximum allowed on the
jury’s findings, based on evidence proved by preponderance at
sentencing.89 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated
that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”90
The analytical framework that emerged from Jones and
Apprendi focused exclusively on the individual rights of the ac83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 244 (“It is therefore no trivial question to ask whether recognizing an unlimited legislative power to authorize determinations setting
ultimate sentencing limits without a jury would invite erosion of the jury’s
function to a point against which a line must necessarily be drawn.”).
86. Id. at 248 (“The point is simply that diminishment of the jury’s significance by removing control over facts determining a statutory sentencing
range would resonate with the claims of earlier controversies, to raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet settled.”).
87. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 426–27 (arguing that Jones signaled a
return to the individual rights model of Mullaney).
88. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468–69 (2000).
89. Id. at 469.
90. Id. at 490.
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cused.91 That framework developed as the standard constitutional challenge to sentences under the Guidelines.92 The separation of powers issue was brushed under the rug because the
Court rolled out the red carpet for the Sixth Amendment challenge.93 There was no apparent need to address the separation
of powers in the context of the Guidelines because the Court
had not addressed it in the prior decisions other than Mistretta.94
Blakely v. Washington95 was the final link between the
Court’s individual rights analysis and the Guidelines. The defendant directly challenged the constitutionality of Washington’s sentencing guidelines under the Sixth Amendment.96
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the application of Washington’s guidelines—which were substantially the
same as the Federal Guidelines—was unconstitutional under
the Sixth Amendment when used to sentence a defendant to a
longer prison term than would have been allowed based on the
evidence heard by the jury.97
In United States v. Booker,98 the Court finally tackled the
ostensible conflict between the Guidelines and Apprendi. The
case was a direct challenge to the constitutionality of the
Guidelines when used to impose a sentence above the statutory
maximum based solely on the facts found by the jury at trial.99
What appeared on its face to be a simple application of Blakely
ended up as a compromise decision, resulting in two separate
majority opinions as well as four separate dissenting opinions.100 The constitutional majority101 held that Blakely’s rea91. See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58
STAN. L. REV. 989, 1042–43 (2006) (arguing that the Court focused solely on
the defendant’s individual rights instead of the Guidelines’ structural problems).
92. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007); United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005).
93. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042–43.
94. See id. at 1041–43.
95. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
96. Id. at 301.
97. Id. at 313.
98. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
99. See id. at 226 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part)
(“The question presented in each of these cases is whether an application of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.”).
100. See id. at 225.
101. Of the two majority opinions, the first, written by Justice Stevens and
joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, concluded that the
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soning also applies to the Federal Guidelines.102 The remedial
majority,103 however, held that, in light of the constitutional
majority’s decision, the appropriate remedy was to excise those
provisions of the SRA that have the effect of making the Guidelines mandatory.104
The result left the Guidelines in limbo. They were no longer mandatory, but the remedial majority articulated that sentencing judges were still required to take them into consideration.105 Sentencing judges must now go through a two-step
process to determine the appropriate sentence.106 Calculating
the appropriate Guidelines sentence is the first step.107 Next,
the judge decides whether that sentence is reasonable in light
of the considerations set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).108 This
determination of reasonableness became the next point of conflict for the courts. A circuit split developed over whether it was
appropriate to accord a presumption of reasonableness to sentences that fell within the appropriate Guidelines range.109
The Supreme Court took up that question in Rita v. United
States.110 Rita was the Court’s first decision on the Guidelines
since the upheaval of Booker. It held that a federal appellate
court “may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district
court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentenc-

Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Blakely and Apprendi did apply to the
Guidelines. See id. at 226–27. This will be referred to as the “constitutional
majority” to avoid confusion with the second majority opinion.
102. Id.
103. The second majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer and joined by
Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, O’Connor, and Ginsburg, decided the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation. See id. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). This will be referred to as the “remedial
majority.”
104. Id. at 245.
105. See id. at 264.
106. 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 526.1 (3d ed. 2004).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Compare United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2006) (accepting the position that sentences that are properly calculated and fall within
the Guidelines’ range are presumed to be reasonable), and United States v.
Lewis, 436 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2006) (same), with United States v. Fernandez,
443 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2006) (taking the position that sentences that fall within
the Guidelines range are not presumed to be reasonable), and United States v.
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2006) (same).
110. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
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ing Guidelines.”111 As a corollary, it held that this presumption
does not violate the Sixth Amendment as it has been interpreted in Apprendi and Booker.112 Again, the Court was silent
on the separation of powers. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring
opinion but took issue with the majority’s opinion.113 “The
Court,” Justice Scalia wrote, “has reintroduced the constitutional defect that Booker purported to eliminate.”114 According
to Justice Scalia, the perception of which branch of the government controls individual sentences is the only difference between the pre-Booker system and the post-Rita system.115
Rita dealt only with appellate review of sentences falling
within the applicable Guidelines range.116 Most recently, in
Gall v. United States117 and Kimbrough v. United States,118 the
Court addressed the contentious issue of “reasonableness” review for sentences that deviated from the applicable Guidelines
range.119 It held that appellate courts could not require a showing of “extraordinary” circumstances to justify a deviation from
the Guidelines range.120 Although both Justice Ginsburg, in
Kimbrough, and Justice Stevens, in Gall, took pains to reaffirm
the advisory nature of the Guidelines post-Booker,121 they were
steadfast in asserting that the Guidelines remain the default
for individual sentences.122 The Court said that the Guidelines
111. Id. at 2462.
112. Id. at 2467.
113. See id. at 2474 (Scalia, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 2476.
115. See id. (“If a sentencing system is permissible in which some sentences
cannot lawfully be imposed by a judge unless the judge finds certain facts by a
preponderance of the evidence, then we should have left in place the compulsory Guidelines that Congress enacted, instead of imposing this jerry-rigged
scheme of our own.”).
116. See id. at 2463 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
117. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
118. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
119. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 591; Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564.
120. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595 (“We reject, however, an appellate rule that
requires ‘extraordinary’ circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range.”).
121. See id. at 594; Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564 (“We hold that, under
Booker, the cocaine Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, are advisory
only . . . .”).
122. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594 (“It is also clear that a district judge must
give serious consideration to the extent of any departure from the Guidelines
and must explain his conclusion that an unusually lenient or an unusually
harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient justifications.”); Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574.
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are the baseline for sentencing, but a district judge may, after
“serious consideration,” vary from the structure if it is “reasonable” in the case at bar.123
With the exception of Mistretta, the Supreme Court’s
Guidelines jurisprudence focuses exclusively on the individual
rights concerns of the Sixth Amendment and Due Process
Clause.124 This is likely a result of inertia from the preGuidelines cases such as Jones and Apprendi. Although that
analysis is necessary when dealing with the Guidelines, it is
not sufficient.125 The Guidelines present structural problems
that are not adequately resolved by the individual rights analysis. By relying exclusively on the individual rights analysis, the
Court has created a blind spot in its sentencing jurisprudence
and fashioned incomplete remedies as a result.
II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE AND THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The Supreme Court’s individual rights focus has come at
the expense of the Guidelines’ structural infirmity—the separation of powers.126 In the context of the criminal process, the individual rights provisions of the Sixth Amendment, the Due
Process Clause, and the structural concerns of the separation of
powers are two sides of the same coin.127 The Guidelines cases
are unsatisfying because the Court is only dealing with one side
of the coin.128 Although addressing different symptoms, both
123. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596 (“As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and
the initial benchmark.”); Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574 (“As explained in Rita
and Gall, district courts must treat the Guidelines as the ‘starting point and
initial benchmark.’”).
124. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007); United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005).
125. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042–43 (stating that the separation of
powers analysis is a necessary corollary to the individual rights analysis).
126. See id. at 1042. (“[I]ts failure to focus on the separation of powers and
the structural check provided by the jury led it to miss the real problem with
the Guidelines . . . .”).
127. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (arguing that the framers believed that individual rights and
the separation of powers were so intertwined that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary given the structural protections of the Constitution itself ); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 546–51 (arguing
that no Bill of Rights is necessary to protect the liberty of the individual and,
in fact, that such a bill would weaken the rights protected by the structure of
the Constitution).
128. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1012–16 (arguing that both procedural
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are attacking the same problem—governmental tyranny—from
different perspectives.129 The individual rights protections—
without the structural counterparts—are insufficient.130 Until
the Court deals with the structural concern, it will never fully
resolve the constitutional infirmities that have been haunting
the Guidelines.
A. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE
This Section provides an overview of separation of powers
theory. It begins with a discussion of the framers’ motivations
and understanding. It then describes the structural safeguards
that the framers included in the Constitution and analyzes the
Court’s enforcement of those safeguards in the criminal context. It argues that while the Court’s sentencing cases have defined and protected the structural roles of the legislature and
jury, they have failed to offer parallel safeguards for the structural role of the judiciary.
1. Rationale: The Framers’ Mistrust of Aggregated Power
A “profound mistrust of government” and a fear of tyranny
that arises from the aggregation of power lay at the heart of
any theory of separation of powers.131 According to the framers,
the separation of powers is second in importance only to the
ability of government to control the governed.132 They recognized that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or
many . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”133 James Madison equated tyranny with the mere accumulation of excess power.134 The separation of powers was a
and structural constitutional safeguards were intended as checks on governmental abuse).
129. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 546–
51.
130. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 450–51 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Barkow,
supra note 91, at 1034 (“The individual rights perspective misses these structural concerns and cannot bear the weight of policing the inequalities that the
separation of powers is designed to address.”).
131. Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 456–57. “If men were angels,” wrote
James Madison, “no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 331.
132. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 331.
133. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 307–08.
134. Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 464.
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doctrine of prevention; the goal was to avoid accumulation of
power before it occurred.135
The framers imposed a structure with three distinct
branches as a means of avoiding tyranny.136 The division of
power between the three branches was a “prophylactic” to prevent any one branch from acquiring sufficient power to “subvert
popular sovereignty and individual liberty.”137 Although the ultimate end is the protection of individual liberty, the doctrine of
separation of powers is an internal structural check on accumulation of power.138
2. Structure: The Separation of Powers Inherent in the
Constitution
The framers recognized that the criminal process is particularly ripe for abuses and carefully crafted a system to minimize that possibility.139 Within the criminal process, power is divided between the legislature, the executive, the jury, and the
judge.140 The role of the legislature is to define criminal activi135. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 121 (William Peden ed., Univ. of N.C. Press 1982) (1787) (“The time to guard against
corruption and tyranny, is before they shall have gotten hold of us. It is better
to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to trust to drawing his teeth and talons
after he shall have entered.”).
136. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (describing “a vigorous
Legislative Branch,” an “independent Executive Branch,” and an “equally independent” judicial branch).
137. Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 463.
138. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 860
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Framers also understood that a principal benefit of the separation of judicial power from the legislative and executive
powers would be the protection of individual litigants from decisionmakers
susceptible to majoritarian pressures.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 1, at 546–47, 550–51.
139. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”); cf. Barkow, supra note 91, at 994 (“[A]s a matter of traditional
constitutional interpretation, a strict separation of powers in criminal law
matters has a stronger textual and historical pedigree than in other contexts.”).
140. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 307
(“[T]he legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate
and distinct.”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 81–104 (1998)
(discussing the centrality of the jury in the criminal process); Barkow, supra
note 91, at 1015–17 (discussing the role that each branch plays in the criminal
process). Because the role of the executive branch is peripheral to this analysis, it is not detailed here. Briefly, the role of the executive is to prosecute individuals who violate the statutes passed by Congress. See Redish & Cisar,
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ty.141 Congress makes policy decisions regarding what conduct
or activities ought to be proscribed by law.142 It then defines
and proscribes that conduct in a statute.143 Along with the definition, the legislature articulates a range of acceptable sanctions for violation of the statute.144
Generally speaking, this was the approach prior to the early 1980s.145 Since that time, Congress has attempted to exercise
control over the sentences imposed on individual defendants.146
This is inconsistent with the original understanding of separation of powers because the legislature exercises judicial power
in violation of Articles I and III.147 The Apprendi line examined
the boundaries of legislative power through the individual
rights analysis. The implicit question was always whether the
legislature had the power to take the action that it did.148 On
the surface, the cases questioned whether the legislature’s action violated the Sixth Amendment or due process rights of an
supra note 6, at 480 (arguing that the existence of an executive power presupposes a law to be executed).
141. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34
(1812) (“The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime,
affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of
the offence.”).
142. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 479 (“‘[L]egislative’ power includes only the authority to promulgate generalized standards and requirements of citizen behavior or to dispense benefits—to achieve, maintain, or
avoid particular social policy results.”).
143. See id.
144. See NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE ET AL., SENTENCING, SANCTIONS, AND
CORRECTIONS 81 (2d ed. 2002) (“The legislature exercises neither primary nor
secondary responsibility in the sentencing process. Even so, the legislature
does play an initial pivotal role in the sentencing process (a) by defining and
proscribing certain activities as criminal, (b) by prescribing the corresponding
sanctions, and (c) by establishing the sentencing structure and defining the
roles of the actors.”).
145. See Douglas A. Berman, Foreward: Beyond Blakely and Booker: Pondering Modern Sentencing Process, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 654–
55, 658–59 (2005).
146. See id.
147. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 310
(“Were the power of judging joined with the legislature, the life and liberty of
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be
the legislator.”); Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 455 n.24 (“The separation of
powers protections are, in fact, explicitly embodied in the text—in portions of
Articles I, II, and III that convey to each branch a specific type of governmental power.”).
148. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476–77 (2000); McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 83–91 (1986); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
198, 201–02, 210 (1977).
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individual, but, as a consequence, they defined the structural
role of the legislature.149
The role of the jury is to adjudicate guilt based on the legislative definitions.150 Under the framers’ structure, the jury decides the guilt or innocence of the defendant.151 The question is
whether the accused committed the act proscribed by the statute. If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused committed the act, he is found guilty and handed
over to the judge to articulate an appropriate sanction.152
The line of cases from In re Winship through Rita, with the
exception of Mistretta, all focused on this discrete aspect of the
structure.153 These cases entrenched the jury as a fundamental
individual right in the criminal process.154 As a consequence,
they also cemented the structural function of the jury.155 In deciding the implicit question of whether the legislature’s action
was a legitimate exercise of power, the Court focused of whether the action removed responsibility from the jury.156 Accordingly, they delineated the structural role of the jury.
The judge’s role is to sentence individuals who have been
convicted by a jury based on his discretion and experience.157 If
149. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477–84 (implying that the legislature’s actions were not within its powers); McMillan, 477 U.S. at 83–91 (implying that
the legislature had broad power to define the elements of crimes).
150. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1015 (“The Constitution therefore provides in Article III—the Article establishing the judicial role in government—
that the trial of all crimes must be by jury.”).
151. See id. (describing the jury’s unreviewable power to acquit).
152. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 733, 743–44 (1980).
153. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476–77; McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84–87; cf. In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359–64 (1970).
154. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230–33 (2005); Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 476–78.
155. By requiring that all facts of consequence be proven to a jury, the cases ensured that none of the other branches could usurp the jury’s role of adjudicating guilt.
156. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476–77, 490.
157. See id. at 481 (“[J]udges in this country have long exercised discretion
of this nature in imposing sentence within statutory limits in the individual
case.”); Schulhofer, supra note 152, at 743–44. Implicit in the traditional roles
of juries and judges is a distinction between guilt and culpability. Cf. Weinstein, supra note 2, at 407–08 (discussing the distinction between guilt and culpability in relation to the Court’s decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur). Guilt is defined as having committed the acts proscribed in the statute. See STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 5, at 22 (discussing the relationship between the adjudication of guilt and proof of the elements of a crime). Culpability is the
blameworthiness of the defendant. See id. Juries decide whether the defen-
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a defendant is convicted by a jury of robbery, and, according to
the legislature, robbery is punishable by anywhere from one to
five years in prison, the judge is free to take into account anything relevant to the defendant’s culpability in determining
where, between one and five years, the sentence ought to fall.
This allows the sentences to be tailored, not only to the crime,
but to the criminal as well.158 This discretion prevents the government from imposing unjust sentences because of mechanical
legislative “diktats.”159
The Court’s sentencing cases provide scant support for the
judge’s function in the criminal context. Unlike the jury, the
cases did not contemplate the judge as a fundamental aspect of
the individual rights analysis.160 And unlike the legislature, the
cases did not involve a challenge to judicial action.161 Accordingly, the decisions did not provide the same protection for the
structural role of the judiciary.162
The framers’ separation of powers was a “self-executing
safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other.”163 For this system to work,
each branch must be “entirely free from the control or coercive
influence, direct or indirect . . . of the others.”164 That means, in
the criminal arena, the judiciary must exercise its traditional
dant’s actions conformed to the statutory definition. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
477 (noting the jury’s role in determining whether a defendant is guilty of
every statutory element of a crime). Judges, on the other hand, determined
what the punishment should be, within the statutory range, based on an interpretation of the defendant’s culpability. See id. at 482. Judges were entrusted with this responsibility because of their unique position allowing them
to see all of the defendants coming through the system and to compare their
actions.
158. See Gertner, supra note 21, at 528–29 (“Disparity inheres in any system that seeks to provide proportional punishment, that tailors the punishment to fit, not just the crime, but the criminal, and that purports to be a national system.”).
159. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 14, 22, 30.
160. Cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476–80 (focusing on the jury’s role in protecting individual rights).
161. Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 83–91 (1986) (arguing that
the legislature’s action did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment or
due process rights).
162. Again, the Apprendi line focused on the interplay between the legislatures and the juries. Although the framework used was individual rights, the
result was an understanding of those branches roles in relation to one another.
Because the judge was not part of the framework, his role eluded description
and protection.
163. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976).
164. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
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role—sentencing—independently of the legislature in order to
maintain the integrity of the constitutional structure and prevent the tyranny at which the structure was aimed.165 The
Court’s jurisprudence has failed to protect the judiciary’s role
from legislative encroachment.
B. THE GUIDELINES AS A VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS
The Guidelines are a violation of the structure crafted by
the framers and laid out in the Constitution.166 They are a legislative effort to exert control over individual sentences, rather
than define crimes and general sentencing ranges.167 The legislature usurps judicial power by removing the traditional discretion afforded to sentencing judges and replacing it with ministerial duties.168 Keeping in mind the traditional roles discussed
above, Justice William Rehnquist’s statement in McMillan,
that the law “operates solely to limit the sentencing court’s discretion in selecting a penalty within the range,”169 is evidence
of the separation of powers violation inherent in this type of
legislation.170 The solitary role of the sentencing judge in the
criminal process is to exercise his discretion and determine individual sentences.171 Insofar as the Guidelines remove that
discretion, they are a violation of the separation of powers.172
165. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 860
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The federal judicial power, then, must be
exercised by judges who are independent of the Executive and the Legislature
in order to maintain the checks and balances that are crucial to our constitutional structure.”).
166. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042 (“The Guidelines therefore take
constitutional power away from the judiciary, thereby increasing the power of
Congress and the executive.”).
167. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1946 (1988) (discussing the Commission’s role as creating a system of guidelines that took into
account all relevant aspects in sentencing an individual).
168. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042 (arguing that the SRA transferred
power away from the judicial branch and towards the legislative branch).
169. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).
170. Granted, the statute in McMillan was not part of the Guidelines. But
the mandatory minimums discussed there have the same constitutional problems as the Guidelines.
171. See Schulhofer, supra note 152, at 743–44.
172. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 309
(“[W]here the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands
which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.”); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5,
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1. Separation of Powers and the Pre-Booker Guidelines
The Guidelines prior to Booker presented the same separation of power problem that was implicit in the statutory provisions in Jones and Apprendi.173 In both Jones and Apprendi,
the legislatures attempted to use “sentencing factors” to limit
judicial discretion in individual sentencing, rather than to define the elements of a crime.174 In Jones, the Court avoided the
structural issue by interpreting the statute to define multiple
crimes with distinguishing elements that must be proven to a
jury.175 This resolved any potential separation of powers conflict by interpreting the legislature’s act as a definition of three
separate crimes with more narrow sentencing ranges, rather
than one crime with limitations on judicial sentencing discretion. The separation of powers is not offended as long as Congress defines a crime and prescribes a range based on the elements of that crime, instead of defining facts, not proven to a
jury, that limit judicial discretion within that range.
In Apprendi, the Court took a slightly different approach.
The Court effectively left New Jersey with two options: it could
either stop applying the hate crimes statute at sentencing, or it
could prove the elements of that statute to the jury.176 If the
state chose the former, there is no constitutional problem because the sentence would be based only on the elements proven
to the jury. If the state chose the latter, similar to Jones, the
application of the hate crimes statute would create a new statute, the elements of which must be proven to a jury.177 In eiat 82 (“The federal Sentencing Guidelines . . . seek not to augment but to replace the knowledge and experience of judges.”).
173. Compare United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005), and
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299–301 (2004), with Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496–97 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227,
232, 252 (1999).
174. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468–71; Jones, 526 U.S. at 230–32.
175. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 251–52 (“In sum, the Government’s view would
raise serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive.
Any doubt on the issue of statutory construction is hence to be resolved in favor of avoiding those questions. This is done by construing § 2119 as establishing three separate offenses by the specification of distinct elements . . . .”).
176. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490–92, 497 (holding that the procedure
challenged in the case is unacceptable, but not mandating a particular remedy).
177. Because the underlying crime in Apprendi was unlawful possession of
a firearm, the new crime would be aggravated unlawful possession of a firearm. The elements of the aggravated crime, which must be proven to a jury,
would include all of the elements of the hate crime statute. This would be
comparable to the distinction between grand and petit larceny, all elements of
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ther option, returning the legislature back to its constitutional
role and removing it from individual sentencing resolves the
separation of powers issue.178
The mandatory Guidelines system in place prior to Booker
contained the same separation of powers problem. Functioning
as an independent statute, the Guidelines limited judicial discretion within statutory ranges rather than defining elements
of a crime.179 The legislature commanded the sentencing judge
to prescribe a particular sentence for a particular defendant
based on facts not defined as elements of the underlying
crime.180 This was a legislative exercise of judicial power; precisely the aggrandizement that the separation of powers was
intended to prevent.181
To be clear, this is a distinct separation of powers problem
than the one addressed in Mistretta.182 There, the Court considered whether Congress’s delegation to the Commission empowered the judicial or executive branch to exercise legislative
power.183 The more pertinent question now—consistent with
the framers’ separation of powers concerns—is whether the
Guidelines allow Congress to exercise judicial power.184 The
which would have to be proven to a jury. See id. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Thus, if the legislature defines some core crime and then provides for
increasing the punishment of that crime upon a finding of some aggravating
fact . . . the core crime and the aggravating fact together constitute an aggravated crime, just as grand larceny is an aggravated form of petit larceny.”).
178. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 479 (describing the legislature’s
role as “promulgat[ing] generalized standards and requirements of citizen behavior”).
179. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1697
(1992) (“Guidelines are administrative handcuffs that are applied to judges
and no one else.”).
180. See id. at 1696 (“The judge sentences ‘by the book.’ He imposes sentences in the traditional manner, after following the guidelines and making
pivotal determinations of fact.” (emphasis added)).
181. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 316
(“The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”); Redish & Cisar, supra
note 6, at 465 (“Each branch is limited to the exercise of the power given to it,
which, in turn, is exclusive of the power exercised by the other
branches . . . .”).
182. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380–85 (1989) (discussing
the separation of powers in regard to Congress’s delegation of authority to the
Commission, not in terms of the Commission’s exercise of that authority).
183. See id.
184. The framers were more concerned with aggrandizement of power by
the legislature than by the other branches. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48
(James Madison), supra note 1, at 317 (“[The legislative department’s] consti-
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questions are mutually exclusive. It is perfectly consistent to
uphold Mistretta’s conclusion—that Congress’s delegation to
the Commission does not violate the separation of powers—
while, at the same time, arguing that the Commission’s Guidelines are in violation.185 In other words, the creation of the
Commission itself is not problematic but that the way in which
the Commission exercised the power granted to it by Congress is
problematic. The Court did not consider this distinction because Booker adopted the individual rights framework from the
Apprendi line.186 As a result, it did not discuss whether the remedy would implicitly resolve the structural issue in the same
way as the Jones and Apprendi remedies.187
2. Separation of Powers and Post-Booker Sentencing
The Booker problem was the legislature’s imposition of a
sentencing system that is independent of the crimes tried in
front of juries.188 This, akin to the Apprendi line, presents both
individual rights and structural problems.189 The legislature
implemented a system that divested judges of the discretion to
sentence within the statutory ranges and exerted control over
individual sentences. The Booker remedy—severing the mandatory nature of the Guidelines—does not resolve the separation
of powers problem.190 The remedial majority’s decision lacks
the implicit structural resolution of the Jones and Apprendi solutions.191 Justice Breyer focused exclusively on individual
tutional powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise
limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask . . . the encroachments which it
makes on the coördinate departments.”).
185. It is necessary to recognize the distinction between Congress’s grant of
authority to the Commission and the way in which the Commission exercised
that authority. The former is a question of the judicial exercise of legislative
power while the latter questions the legislative exercise of judicial power.
186. Cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005) (dealing only
with the Sixth Amendment implications).
187. Cf. id. at 245–49 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in
part) (comparing the relative merits of different remedies in terms of congressional intent and individual rights but not explicitly addressing structural
concerns).
188. Cf. id. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in
part).
189. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042–43 (arguing that the individual
rights analysis ignored the structural problems).
190. See id. (arguing that the Court’s focus on individual rights has caused
it to miss the structural problem underlying the Guidelines).
191. Compare Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of
the Court in part) (severing the mandatory nature of the Guidelines but leav-
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rights and deference to Congress while he ignored the parallel
separation of powers violation inherent within the Guidelines.192 Rather than accepting the previous successful models—Jones and Apprendi—the remedial majority opted to explore less “radical” constitutional solutions.193 The question
then, is whether the less “radical” resolution is also less effective.
Proponents of the Booker decision argue that the advisory
Guidelines resolves the structural problem since judges are no
longer forced to sentence in accordance with the narrow Guidelines ranges.194 In a very formalistic sense, that analysis is correct. It fails to take into account, however, a deeper understanding of the motivations behind the separation of powers.195
The structural problem with the Guidelines was not that the
legislature forced judges to sentence within narrower ranges;
such sentencing can be constitutional so long as the legislature
defined narrower crimes and attached narrower statutory
ranges.196 Instead, the problem was that the legislature exerted
control over the sentences given to individual defendants and
limited judicial discretion by pressuring judges to sentence in a
particular fashion.197 The advisory Guidelines retain those
more subtle violations.198 After Booker, although Congress is
defining crimes with broad sentencing ranges, it continues to
exert pressure on judges to sentence within the Guidelines.199
ing the system in place as advisory), with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 492, 497 (2000) (holding that sentences in accordance with the hate
crimes statute were unconstitutional unless the elements of the hate crime
were proven to a jury rather than a judge), and Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 251–52 (1999) (interpreting a New Jersey statute as defining separate crimes rather than sentencing factors that limit judicial discretion).
192. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245, 267–68 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion
of the Court in part).
193. See id. at 247 (discussing which solution would be the least radical).
194. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 429–32 (suggesting that defining the
Guidelines as nonmandatory may resolve the power struggle between the
branches).
195. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–30 (1935)
(discussing indirect, as well as direct, coercion as inconsistent with the separation of powers).
196. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 95–96 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
197. Cf. Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 465 (“Each branch is limited to
the exercise of the power given to it, which, in turn, is exclusive of the power
exercised by the other branches . . . .”).
198. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1043 (suggesting that the mandatory
nature is only part of the larger problem—the expansion of legislative power).
199. See id.
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Though not as overt as the mandatory Guidelines, the postBooker system is still a legislative attempt to control individual
sentences and, as such, is a violation of the separation of powers.200
3. Rita v. United States: Judicial Acquiescence and Legislative
Coercion
The post-Rita system was nothing more than judicial hidethe-ball on separation of powers.201 The Court, as well as some
commentators, argue that Booker and Rita were the final step
in swinging the pendulum back towards the judiciary—in effect, resolving both the individual rights and structural problems.202 One scholar, for example, argued that the current cases
are “Mullaney’s revenge” because they restored judicial discretion to its pre-McMillan level.203 Justice Scalia’s dissent in Rita, however, makes clear that all that has actually changed
since Mistretta is the perception of which branch controls individual sentences.204 That perception is misleading. The Court’s
decision in Rita simply put a gloss of judicial credence on a system that has been a violation of the separation of powers since
its inception.205
Far from a complete solution, the Booker remedy at least
resolved the formal separation of powers violation by eliminating mandatory compliance with the Guidelines.206 Rita reintroduced part of the formal problem that Booker resolved. The only distinction between the Guidelines after Rita and the
Guidelines before Booker was which branch of government re200. See id.
201. Cf. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2476 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that Rita reintroduces the “constitutional defect” that Booker
was aimed at, but does so through judicial rather than legislative means).
202. See id. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I trust that those judges who
had treated the Guidelines as virtually mandatory during the post-Booker interregnum will now recognize that the Guidelines are truly advisory.”); Weinstein, supra note 2, at 409 (arguing that Booker was the final step in returning
to the system supported in Mullaney).
203. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 409.
204. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2476 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the
Court has reintroduced the problem that Booker purported to resolve, but did
so under the guise of judicial authority).
205. Cf. id. (stating that the Court has effectively returned to the preBooker problem, without addressing the separation of powers directly).
206. Cf. Weinstein, supra note 2, at 429–32 (suggesting that defining the
Guidelines as nonmandatory may resolve the power struggle between the
branches).
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quires compliance.207 It is, however, a distinction without a difference.
In Rita, the Court effectively mandated compliance with
the Guidelines.208 Booker’s structural implication made clear
that Congress could not force the judiciary to conform to Congress’s wishes on individual sentencing.209 Rita, on the other
hand, indicated that the Court was willing to pressure the judiciary to do just that.210 This is structural formalism gone awry.
Not only is it inconsistent with the subtle understanding of the
separation of powers discussed in relation to the Booker remedy, it is a return to a more formal violation.
After Booker, Congress could only indirectly control individual sentencing through the advisory Guidelines. After Rita,
Congress could directly control individual sentencing through
judicially endorsed Guidelines. The Court was acquiescing to
congressional involvement in individual sentencing and handing Congress almost complete control over the traditional role
of the judiciary. This is wholly inconsistent with the framers’
understanding of the separation of powers.211 Sentencing
judges were not free to exercise their discretion without congressional interference simply because the Guidelines are not
legislatively mandatory.212 Congress continued to exert a coercive force over judicial discretion and individual sentencing.213
So long as the Guidelines are in place, and allow sentences
based on facts not proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury,
they will present a problem for the separation of powers.214

207. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2476 (Scalia, J., concurring).
208. Although not saying it explicitly, the evidence indicates that lower
courts have taken Rita as an endorsement of the Guidelines. See, e.g., United
States v. Gammicchia, 498 F.3d 467, 468 (7th Cir. 2007). Judge Posner went
so far as to indicate that appealing a within-Guidelines sentence could be construed as frivolous. Id. The Court’s decision makes it much more likely that
sentencing judges will comply with the Guidelines to avoid reversal or remand
on appeal.
209. Cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005).
210. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463.
211. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 309
(“[W]here the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands
which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.”).
212. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259, 264 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of
the Court in part) (commanding that sentencing judges continue to give
weight to the Guidelines despite their advisory nature).
213. See id.
214. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 497 (2000).
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4. Gall v. United States: A Step in the Right Direction?
After Rita, many circuits took the Court’s endorsement of
the Guidelines to heart and effectively made them mandatory,
by way of appellate review, in all but the most extraordinary
cases.215 Without question, Gall and Kimbrough are a step in
the right direction. The focus of the opinions has moved from
the Sixth Amendment concerns that dominated Booker and Rita, to the underlying issue of judicial discretion.216 Despite the
glowing rhetoric endorsing judicial discretion,217 the Court
failed to resolve the structural problem that persisted in the
wake of Booker. Individual sentences are still tethered, albeit
more loosely, to the Guidelines in violation of the separation of
powers.
Although the Court claims that the Guidelines are truly
advisory,218 they retain an unacceptable coercive influence over
the judiciary’s role at sentencing. Both the requirements placed
on the sentencing judges as well as the presumptions on appeal
are evidence of the continued coercive force of the Guidelines.
Kimbrough and Gall each made clear that the Guidelines
must remain the “baseline” or “starting point” for district
judges in their sentencing analysis.219 Kimbrough is a perfect
example. The Court upheld the variance from the Guidelines
because the sentencing judge followed the proper analytical
procedure.220 He calculated the appropriate Guidelines sen-

215. See, e.g., United States v. Gammicchia, 498 F.3d 467, 468 (7th Cir.
2007) (suggesting that a sentence within the Guidelines has a presumption of
reasonableness and that the appeal in this case was “frivolous”).
216. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 605 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“It is telling that the rules set out in the Court’s opinion in the present
case have nothing to do with juries or factfinding and, indeed, that not one of
the facts that bears on petitioner’s sentence is disputed. What is at issue, instead, is the allocation of authority to decide issues of substantive sentencing
policy, an issue on which the Sixth Amendment says absolutely nothing.”).
217. See id. at 596–97 (Stevens, J., majority opinion) (discussing the sentencing judge’s role of weighing all the appropriate factors, not just the Guidelines, when imposing a sentence); Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558,
570–75 (2007) (rejecting the prosecution’s argument that sentencing judges do
not have discretion on the issue of 100-to-1 crack/cocaine disparity).
218. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594; Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 570.
219. See, e.g., Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596 (“As a matter of administration and to
secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and
the initial benchmark.”).
220. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574–75 (upholding the district court’s
sentence because the judge followed the correct procedure in varying from the
Guidelines).
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tence and justified his deviation therefrom.221 This is an example of both the progress that has been made and the steps that
still remain to be taken. Justice Ginsburg recognized the institutional competence of the sentencing judge, and the judiciary
as a whole, in matters of individual sentencing.222 The decision
does not, however, give the sentencing judge the complete discretion contemplated in the framers’ separation of powers.223
Although the Court makes clear that deviations from the
Guidelines are acceptable, judicial discretion is still tethered to,
and limited by, the Guidelines.224 This is a step forward, but is
not the final step necessary to resolve the structural issue.
The coercive influence of the Guidelines is also apparent on
appeal. Although Gall and Kimbrough make clear that belowGuidelines sentences do not have to be justified by extraordinary circumstances,225 those sentences are not granted the presumption of reasonableness that Rita bestowed on withinGuidelines sentences.226 This disparity is stark proof of the
congressional thumb-pressing in favor of within-Guidelines
sentences. Again, this is a congressional exercise of judicial
power over individual sentences and is inconsistent with a
meaningful separation of powers.227
Despite some flowery rhetoric, neither Gall nor Kimbrough
did anything beyond reaffirming the Court’s decision in Booker.
The cases stated unequivocally that the Guidelines are truly
advisory.228 But that is nothing more than a restatement of the
remedial majority’s position from Booker.229 As a result, neither
Gall nor Kimbrough resolved the more subtle separation of
221. See id. at 575–76.
222. See id. at 574–75 (arguing for deference to the decisions of district
judges because of their particular “institutional strengths”).
223. Cf. id. at 574 (stressing the continued importance of the Guidelines as
“benchmark[s]” that represent the compiled wisdom of the Commission).
224. See id.
225. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 595 (2007).
226. Compare Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007) (holding
that circuits may apply a presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines
sentences), with Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597 (rejecting a presumption of unreasonableness for outside-Guidelines sentences, but failing to endorse the same presumption of reasonableness that Rita granted to within-Guidelines sentences).
227. Cf. Barkow, supra note 91, at 1043 (arguing that the mandatory nature is only part of the larger problem—the expansion of legislative power);
Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 465 (“Each branch is limited to the exercise of
the power given to it, which, in turn, is exclusive of the power exercised by the
other branches . . . .”).
228. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594; Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564.
229. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
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powers violations that persisted after Booker. To the Court’s
credit, these cases did repudiate some of the formal separation
of powers violations that certain circuits had endorsed in the
wake of Rita. The Court made clear that neither the legislature
nor the circuit courts could mandate compliance with the
Guidelines. This, however, leaves the sentencing system in the
same place that it was after Booker; Congress continues to exert pressure on judges to sentence within the Guidelines.
Though not as overt as the mandatory Guidelines, the current
system, like the post-Booker system, is still a legislative attempt to control individual sentences and, as such, is a violation of the separation of powers.
5. Necessity of Addressing the Separation of Powers
The Court’s recent decisions—Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough—
show a recognition of the structural problem, but, rather than
address the issue, the Court decided to use sleight of hand to
jerry-rig a solution.230 Language in both Booker and Rita indicates that the Justices are aware of the underlying structural
problem.231 Unfortunately, the Court disregarded the separation of powers and attempted to use a narrow individual rights
analysis to solve a broader problem.232 Assuming that the
Court is aware of the issue, it is important to consider whether
there is a compelling reason why it has chosen not to address
the structural concerns.
One possibility is that the Court considers the individual
rights protections of the Bill of Rights sufficient protection
against governmental tyranny.233 Over the last fifty years, the
Court created a robust system for protecting defendants
230. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2476 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If a sentencing
system is permissible in which some sentences cannot lawfully be imposed by
a judge unless the judge finds certain facts by a preponderance of the evidence, then we should have left in place the compulsory Guidelines that Congress enacted, instead of imposing this jerry-rigged scheme of our own.”).
231. See id. at 2477 (“But there is a fundamental difference, one underpinning our entire Apprendi jurisprudence, between facts that must be found in
order for a sentence to be lawful, and facts that individual judges choose to
make relevant to the exercise of their discretion.”).
232. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042–43.
233. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (“In recent years, perhaps, we have come to think of liberty as
defined by that word in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and as illuminated by the other provisions of the Bill of Rights.”); Barkow, supra note 91, at
1031–32 (discussing why the separation of powers is underenforced in the
criminal arena).
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through the Bill of Rights.234 As long as the system is functioning correctly, rigid enforcement of the separation of powers is
superfluous because the individual rights provisions are ultimately aimed at the same evil—government invasion of individual liberty.235 Unfortunately, robust enforcement of the Bill
of Rights does not render the separation of powers impotent.236
The rights encoded in the Bill of Rights are judicial process
rights. If the legislature is allowed to exercise judicial power, in
violation of the separation of powers, there is no assurance that
the judicial process rights would apply.237 Consequently, a violation of the separation of powers could result in individual
rights violations that bypass the judicial process.238 The argument that the separation of powers is less important because of
the Bill of Rights misunderstands the primacy of the separation
of powers in the framers’ structure.
Another possibility for why the Court has not addressed
the structural concerns is that they have not been raised in the
challenges. This is related to the first possibility. One consequence of the Court’s robust individual rights analysis is that
defendants came to rely on the Bill of Rights for their constitutional challenges.239 All of the Guidelines challenges were
based on the Sixth Amendment or Due Process Clause rather
than separation of powers principles.240 Nevertheless, this does
not relieve the Court of its duty to resolve constitutional infirmities. The Court recognizes the ability of appellate courts to
raise issues that were not addressed by the parties sua

234. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1032.
235. See id. at 1031–32 (“[I]f the individual rights protections serve the
same function as the [separation of powers] . . . there would not be the same
need for greater enforcement of the separation of powers in the criminal arena.”).
236. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It would be a
grave mistake, however, to think a Bill of Rights in Madison’s scheme then or
in sound constitutional theory now renders separation of powers of lesser importance.”).
237. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1033 (“[I]f the legislature were permitted to adjudicate criminal matters, none of the protections that apply to Article III courts would apply, nor would the legislature be subject to the rules of
judicial process.”).
238. See id. at 1033 (“[I]f Congress were allowed to have judicial powers,
the protections associated with judicial process could be bypassed.”).
239. See id. at 1032.
240. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465–66 (2007); United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 298 (2004).
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sponte.241 If there is ever a time when sua sponte decision making is appropriate, it is when the structural integrity of the
Constitution is at stake.
A final possibility is that the Court is dodging the separation of powers to avoid revisiting Mistretta, which appears to be
settled law. As discussed earlier, however, the Court can attend
to the structural problems raised by the Guidelines without
disrupting Mistretta. Mistretta did not address the separation
of powers concern at issue here—the legislative exercise of judicial power.242 And the structural concern at issue in Mistretta—
the executive and judicial exercise of legislative power—need
not be addressed in this context. For that reason, the Court’s
apprehension about addressing the separation of powers because of Mistretta is unfounded.
Regardless of the rationale, the Court’s decision to focus
solely on the individual rights protections created a cumbersome system that does not fully resolve the constitutional problems.243 The Court is attempting to tweak a fundamentally
flawed system rather than trashing a failed experiment and
beginning anew. Although this measured, deferential approach
may be effective, or even laudable, in certain situations, it is
unacceptable when dealing with the criminal process. The
criminal process is too vulnerable to abuse and tyranny to allow
structural violations to persist.244 Congress, through the Guidelines, has stripped the judiciary of its role in the criminal
process.245 The Court must step forward and reassert judicial
control over sentencing. “[A] mere demarcation on parchment of
the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a
sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a
tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the
same hands.”246
241. See Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look
at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 287 (2002)
(citing U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439
(1993)).
242. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380–85 (1989) (dealing
with the delegation of legislative power to the Commission and the placement
of the Commission in the judicial branch).
243. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1031–33, 1042–43.
244. See id. at 1031–34.
245. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 83 (“The judge’s prescribed
role is largely limited to factual determinations and rudimentary arithmetic
operations.”).
246. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 321.
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III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
Booker and Rita proved the insufficiency of the individual
rights analysis for dealing with the more fundamental separation of powers problems that underlie the Guidelines.247 This
Part returns to the issue in Booker and evaluates the remedial
options with an eye toward the separation of powers. It lists the
five reasonable alternatives to the Guidelines and discusses
their implications for separation of powers, concluding that only two resolve the structural problems inherent in the Guidelines. It then contrasts the remaining two solutions and concludes that the differences between them are matters of public
policy, rather than constitutional law. Finally, this Part proposes that the critical decision between the remaining options
ought to be left to Congress, as policymaking is a realm traditionally reserved to the legislature.
A. CONCEIVABLE SOLUTIONS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
IMPLICATIONS
The Court has—either implicitly or explicitly—recognized
five conceptual alternatives to the Guidelines. Each of these
five solutions has slightly different implications for the separation of powers analysis. The first option is to return to a mandatory Guidelines system. Although a conceptual possibility,
this is not a serious option after Apprendi or the constitutional
majority’s decision in Booker.248 As discussed above, the preBooker Guidelines were inconsistent with any robust understanding of the separation of powers.249 Retaining the preBooker Guidelines is not a viable solution.250 It is mentioned
here only as a reference point by which to measure the other
options.
The “undefined approach” is the second possible solution.
Justice Stevens described this approach in his McMillan dis247. Cf. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (2007) (discussing the
rationale behind the presumption of reasonableness for sentences within the
Guidelines); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005) (analyzing
the Guidelines in light of the Sixth Amendment); Barkow, supra note 91, at
1042–43 (discussing the failure of Booker to address the separation of powers
issue).
248. Cf. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–27; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
497 (2000).
249. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042–43.
250. Booker, 543 U.S. at 232.
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sent.251 Under this system, the legislature defines very basic
crimes punishable by extremely wide sentencing ranges.252
Within that range, Congress defines mitigating factors or affirmative defenses that the judge must take into account.
Through those mitigating factors and affirmative defenses,
Congress exerts some control over the sentences given to the
defendants.253 This is similar to the system the Court approved
in Patterson.254
Removing the sections of the statute that render the
Guidelines mandatory is the third option.255 The remedial majority in Booker endorsed this approach.256 The Guidelines remain in place, but are not binding on sentencing judges.257 The
judge is instructed to take the Guidelines into account when
making his ruling but is no longer forced to comply.258
Both of these possibilities—the “undefined approach” and
the advisory Guidelines—are more effective than the retention
of the pre-Booker system, but they fail to resolve the structural
problems. They are attempts to resolve the individual rights issue while side-stepping the separation of powers issue. Under
these systems, the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause are satisfied since the elements of the crime are proven
to a jury.259 But the legislature still controls, through influence
and judicial acquiescence, the individual sentences given out to
defendants.260 Without question, Congress’s influence is less
heavy-handed than under the mandatory Guidelines. Neverthe251. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 100–04 (1986) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210–11 (1977) (upholding New
York’s murder statute despite its lack of a mens rea component). Technically,
the provision in Patterson was an affirmative defense rather than a mitigating
factor, but the comparison is still effective. The point is that the legislature is
defining crimes with broad sentencing ranges but indicating that certain facts
ought to decrease the defendants’ exposure to punishment.
255. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the
Court in part) (“We conclude that this provision must be severed and
excised . . . .”).
256. See id.
257. See id. at 264 (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the
Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when
sentencing.”).
258. Id.
259. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 385–86 (1970).
260. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042–43.
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less, subtle legislative coercion of judicial authority is no less a
violation of the separation of powers.261
The fourth solution is to hold the Guidelines unconstitutional and scrap the entire system.262 This is a return to the
pre-Guidelines sentencing system of Mullaney, whereby Congress defines crimes with a range of possible sentences and the
sentencing judge has discretion to sentence anywhere within
that range.263 This is no different from the system in place prior
to McMillan.264
The fifth and final option, the “jury-proof Guidelines,” retains the mandatory nature of the Guidelines but requires that
all facts necessary to determine the sentence under the Guidelines be proven to a jury.265 Justice Stevens presented this solution in his Booker dissent.266 Conceptually, this is no different
than complete invalidation because the legislature is defining
facts that, if proved to a jury, trigger a punishment range.267
An example will prove helpful. Assume, for the sake of this
hypothetical, that a mandatory guidelines system is in place.
Assume that Congress has defined larceny as “the unlawful
taking of chattels” and prescribed a maximum punishment of
ten years in prison. Assume that the guidelines instruct the
sentencing judge that, if he finds at sentencing that the chattel
is worth more than fifty dollars, then the appropriate punishment is between five and ten years. Finally, assume that the

261. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–30 (1935)
(discussing whether indirect, as well as direct, coercion is inconsistent with
the separation of powers).
262. See id.
263. But see Weinstein, supra note 2, at 429–30 (arguing that a complete
invalidation is unnecessary to return to a pre-McMillan sentencing scheme).
264. See generally Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
265. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 284–85 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“I would simply allow the Government to continue doing what it
has done since this Court handed down Blakely—prove any fact that is required to increase a defendant’s sentence under the Guidelines to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
266. See id.
267. See id. at 284 –85 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that jury factfinding under the Guidelines passes the requisite constitutional tests). In
practice, this system would be slightly odd, but not actually any different from
the first option. It would make the factors in the Guidelines elements of crimes
that are independently defined in other statutes. To discover what elements
must be proven, the prosecutor would be forced to look not only at the underlying statute but also at the Guidelines.
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Court holds the system unconstitutional and is fashioning a
remedy.268
Under the fourth solution—complete invalidation—the
guidelines would be meaningless. The definition of larceny
would be “unlawful taking of chattels” and the maximum punishment would be ten years in prison. The judge would be free
to sentence a man convicted of larceny to anywhere between
zero and ten years depending on the judge’s knowledge and experience.
Under the jury-proof Guidelines the definition of larceny
would change as a result of the guidelines. There would effectively be two separate crimes: “Larceny of chattels worth less
than fifty dollars,” with a punishment range of zero to five
years, and “Larceny of chattels worth more than fifty dollars,”
with a punishment range of five to ten years. If the jury convicted a man of the latter, the judge would then be free to sentence him to anywhere between five and ten year depending on
the judge’s discretion.
Both of these options have positive implications for the
structural problems inherent in the Guidelines. They resolve
the separation of powers issue by placing the legislature back
in the position of defining crimes and sentencing ranges instead
of limiting judicial discretion within a range.269 Once the jury
determines that the defendant committed the proscribed act,
the judge is free to exercise his discretion and sentence the individual defendant anywhere within the statutory range. Congress’s action in both of these solutions defines crimes and attaches punishment ranges but does not limit judicial discretion
within those ranges.
Given that these solutions—complete invalidation and the
jury-proof Guidelines—are the only alternatives that resolve
the structural issues, the next step is to contrast the relative
merits of complete invalidation against those of a mandatory
Guidelines system requiring jury proof of the relevant facts.
B. COMPLETE INVALIDATION VERSUS JURY-PROOF GUIDELINES
Structurally, these two solutions are indistinguishable. It
is, therefore, necessary to examine the relative merits of these
options on factors above and beyond the separation of powers.
268. This is precisely the issue that was presented to the remedial majority
in Booker. Id. at 246 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
269. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 479 (defining the legislative role).
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The following discussion examines these alternatives in light of
the individual rights concerns, the opportunity for sentencing
disparity, and the ease of implementation. While neither alternative is perfect, they are both superior to the current system
because—as this Section will make clear—their problems do
not arise from the Constitution. This Section concludes that the
Court—in accordance with the separation of powers—must allow Congress to make the decision between these two options
because the decision rests on policy determinations, rather
than on constitutional analysis.
1. Complete Invalidation: The Return to Mullaney
Employing the rhetoric of the remedial majority, invalidating the Guidelines outright and returning to a pre-1984 sentencing structure is the most “radical” resolution.270 There is no
question that this option resolves the individual rights concerns
of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The
Court has consistently upheld the traditional sentencing system in the face of individual rights challenges.271 According to
Apprendi, the individual rights provisions entitle the defendant
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury of every element of
a crime.272 This would not be an issue with a return to the preGuidelines system. Returning to the larceny example, under
the complete invalidation solution, the elements of larceny are
that a chattel was taken and that the taking was unlawful. Before being convicted, the accused would be entitled to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury on both of those elements.
This fully satisfies the individual rights concerns of the Sixth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
With the structural and individual rights concerns alleviated, the question is one of disparity.273 There is little ques270. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–47 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
delivering the opinion of the Court in part) (discussing which remedy would
deviate least radically from Congress’s intent).
271. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 216 (1977) (upholding a
conviction under the New York murder statute on the grounds that the New
York system was consistent with the Due Process Clause).
272. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
273. Disparity is particularly relevant in this context because of the role it
played in leading to the creation of the Guidelines in the first place. Given that
sentencing disparity was a principal motivation behind the Guidelines, it is
intuitive to prefer an alternative that minimizes the perceived problem.

GRONG_4FMT

1622

5/24/2008 11:38 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:1584

tion that the traditional sentencing system is susceptible to
disparities in sentencing.274 As long as judges are allowed discretion to sentence within a statutory range, there will be disparities between the sentences imposed on individual defendants.275 This is, however, not necessarily a negative. A
primary justification for judicial discretion is to ensure proportionality in sentencing.276 For centuries, the American criminal
justice system recognized that no two defendants are alike and
that the sentence ought to be tailored to each specific case.277 It
is, therefore, not entirely clear that reducing sentencing disparity is a laudable goal.278 It is possible that the mechanical application of uniform sentences to all defendants, regardless of
individual circumstances, will lead to as many, if not more, unjust sentences than will judicial discretion.279 As such, disparate sentences may actually be more “just” than the uniform
sentences promoted by the Guidelines.280 If this is the case, it is
difficult to justify support for the Guidelines.
This is true, however, only if the disparity is not a result of
illegitimate sentencing factors such as race or social class. This
was the primary criticism of the traditional model prior to the
Guidelines.281 The studies upon which those criticisms were
based, however, have been called into question.282 Based on
274. See Stith & Koh, supra note 18, at 228–29 (surveying the criticisms
levied against the traditional model, particularly those regarding disparity in
sentencing).
275. See Gertner, supra note 21, at 528–29 (“Disparity inheres in any system that seeks to provide proportional punishment, that tailors the punishment to fit, not just the crime, but the criminal, and that purports to be a national system.”).
276. See id.
277. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 104–06 (arguing that uniformity in sentencing is not consistent with just sentencing).
278. Id.
279. See id. at 105 (“We reject the premise of sentencing reformers that
uniform treatment mean equal treatment, and thus that judicial discretion . . .
necessarily denies justice.”).
280. See id. (“A just sentence must also be a reasoned sentence and a proportional sentence, imposed through procedures that comport with basic understandings of fairness and Due Process of law in a constitutional scheme of
checks and balances.”).
281. See Breyer, supra note 20, at 4 –5 (discussing unwarranted disparity
as a motivating factor behind the Guidelines); see also STITH & CABRANES,
supra note 5, at 104 (“Reduction of ‘unwarranted sentencing disparities’ was
a—probably the—goal of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.”).
282. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 106–12 (criticizing the preGuidelines empirical research on sentencing disparity and factors such as
race).
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more current research, it does not appear that the sentencing
disparities were correlated with the illegitimate factors.283
Even if judges did not take illegitimate factors into account, it is not beyond their power to do so under the traditional system. The issue, then, is whether a system can be put in
place that is consistent with the traditional model but also ensures that judges do not consider illegitimate factors while exercising their discretion. While crafting such a system is
beyond the scope of this analysis, there is no reason to believe
that it is an insurmountable obstacle. It is worth pointing out,
however, that illegitimate disparity is the largest potential
drawback of the traditional sentencing model.284
The final issue is the ease of implementation. This is, on its
face, a selling point for the traditional model. The system was
in place for over a century in this country and returning to it
would require nothing more than the invalidation of the Guidelines.285 Opponents of the traditional model have advanced various arguments on this issue.286 The primary arguments are
that judges do not want the responsibility associated with
broad discretion287 or that they lack any special competence in
the area of sentencing.288 These objections, however, do not carry significant weight.
First, sentencing is intended to be a solemn, difficult affair
that the Constitution entrusted to the judiciary.289 Our system
does not allow Congress to avoid difficult or distasteful policy
decisions simply because it does not want the responsibility. In
the same way, it must not allow judges to shirk their sentenc283. See id. at 111 (“In particular, every study of the federal courts in the
pre-Guidelines era found that race was not a significant factor in explaining
variation in sentences.”).
284. See id.
285. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–50 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
286. See Gertner, supra note 21, at 537–38 (describing judges’ reactions to
the prospect of abandoning the Guidelines).
287. Alex Kozinski, Carthage Must Be Destroyed, 12 FED SENT’G REP. 67,
67 (2002) (“I found sentencing traumatic in the pre-Guidelines days. . . .
Somehow I felt it was wrong for one human being to have that much power
over another. . . . Sentencing ranges [under the Guidelines] are narrow and
presumably take into account all of those factors I don’t feel competent to
weigh . . . .”).
288. See Gertner, supra note 21, at 537–38 (describing judges’ reactions to
the prospect of abandoning the Guidelines).
289. See Oberdorfer, supra note 10, at 14 (describing sentencing prior to
the Guidelines as a “serious and solemn ceremony”).
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ing duty because it is unpleasant. Judicial sentencing ensures
that the government contemplates the decision to divest a person of his liberty in each and every case.290 Forcing an agent of
the government—the judge—to stand eye-to-eye with the defendant and make a decision regarding the length of imprisonment injects a level of individuality into the system.291 While it
is certainly easier for a judge to apply the Guidelines mechanically, that comes with the risk of a more fundamentally unfair
sentence from the failure to take into account each person’s independent circumstances.292
Second, it is difficult to believe that judges have somehow
lost the ability to exercise their discretion since 1984.293 To argue that judges are not competent to decide appropriate sentences flies in the face of two centuries worth of criminal jurisprudence.294 There is no reason to believe that judges are any
less competent at sentencing now than they were prior to the
implementation of the Guidelines.
On balance, a return to the traditional sentencing model is
an attractive solution. Not only does it resolve the individual
rights concerns, it is also a simple solution to implement. The
question for Congress is what level of disparity is acceptable as
a matter of public policy. Again, this is not a question within
the particular competence of the judiciary.
2. Jury-Proof Guidelines
The jury-proof Guidelines proposed by Justice Stevens are
a less radical option than complete invalidation.295 Consistent
290. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 78.
291. See id. (“The judge’s power—duty—to weigh all of the circumstances
of the particular case, and all of the purposes of criminal punishment,
represented an important acknowledgement of the moral personhood of the
defendant and the moral dimension of crime and punishment.”); Gertner,
supra note 21, at 538 (“[Sentencing] is about proportionality; it requires individualizing so that the punishment fits the crime.”).
292. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 105 (defining a just sentence
as one that is proportional, reasoned, and procedurally correct); Oberdorfer,
supra note 10, at 16 (describing the inherent risk of unfair sentences associated with the rigidity of the Guidelines).
293. See Gertner, supra note 21, at 538 (rejecting arguments that judges
are somehow incompetent to determine appropriate sentences).
294. See id. at 527 (discussing the pre-Guidelines conception of judges as
“expert[s]” in sentencing).
295. Justice Breyer argued in Booker that this was a more radical departure than advisory Guidelines. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
246–49 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). But, because an advisory Guidelines system fails to address the separation of powers,
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with the traditional model, there is little doubt that this system
would resolve the individual rights problems.296 In fact, this
system was originally conceived with those problems in
mind.297 Under the individual rights analysis, the question is
whether all facts necessary to impose a particular punishment
have been proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.298 The
jury-proof Guidelines are perfectly consistent with those individual rights concerns. Returning again to the larceny example,
under the jury-proof Guidelines there are two separate crimes:
“Larceny of chattels worth more than fifty dollars” and “Larceny of chattels worth less than fifty dollars.” This system imposes an additional element—the value of the chattel—that must
be proven to a jury. Before being convicted, a defendant would
be entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury of all of
the elements, including the value of the chattel. Like the complete invalidation system, this fully satisfies the individual
rights concerns of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause. The jury-proof Guidelines would undoubtedly create
more specific crimes with narrower sentencing ranges, but that
is irrelevant to the individual rights question.299
Whereas the traditional model raises concerns about disparity, the jury-proof Guidelines err on the side of consistency.300 Incorporating the jury into the Guidelines system would,
as the larceny example suggested, effectively create new crimes

it is not an acceptable option.
296. Even the remedial majority in Booker recognized that jury fact-finding
was a sufficient solution to the constitutional issues. See id. (accepting Stevens’ jury-proof system as a possible solution, but rejecting it on prudential
grounds).
297. See id. at 284–85 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the appropriate solution to the individual rights concerns arising from the Guidelines is to
require jury fact-finding for sentencing).
298. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
299. The legislature is free, within the confines of the Constitution, to define crimes and sentencing ranges as it sees fit. See Redish & Cisar, supra
note 6, at 479–80. There is no due process or Sixth Amendment problem if the
legislature decides to divide larceny into two separate crimes, petit and grand
larceny, with more narrow sentencing ranges attached to each, so long as the
element that distinguishes the two is proven to a jury.
300. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 296–97 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Congress’s intent to minimize disparities is the centerpiece of this system).
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with much narrower sentencing ranges.301 This limited range
for judicial discretion would make it nearly impossible for the
disparities that occurred in the 1970s to repeat themselves.
Certainly disparities could arise, just as they did under the
traditional model. But the scope of the disparity would likely be
smaller because the ranges available under the Guidelines are
extremely narrow compared to the traditional sentencing
ranges.
The difficulty of implementation is the major drawback of
this system.302 The remedial majority in Booker cited this as
one of the main reasons it decided to forego this alternative.303
Justice Breyer argued that this system would place a massive
administrative burden on the prosecution and the jury.304
There is credence to this argument. Requiring that all elements
of a Guidelines sentence be proven to a jury forces the prosecutor to be very specific with the crime charged and proven.305 It
also complicates the jury’s decision.306 Justice Stevens responded to these arguments in his Booker dissent.307 He argued first
that the parade-of-horribles that Justice Breyer envisioned was
unlikely to occur with any frequency.308 His second, and more
convincing argument, was that “the Constitution does not permit efficiency to be [the] primary concern.”309 The jury is rarely,
if ever, the most efficient means of adjudicating guilt, but it is
the system chosen by the framers and ingrained in the Constitution.310
301. See id.
302. See id. at 254 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
303. See id. (“Third, the sentencing statutes, read to include the Court’s
Sixth Amendment requirement, would create a system far more complex than
Congress could have intended.”).
304. See id. (describing the procedural difficulties that might face juries
and prosecutors under the “jury-proof Guidelines”).
305. See id. (“How would courts and counsel work with an indictment and a
jury trial that involved not just whether a defendant robbed a bank but also
how?”).
306. See id. at 254–55 (indicating all of the minute factual matters that the
jury would have to decide and arguing that this would unduly hamper the
criminal system).
307. See id. at 288–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
308. See id. (arguing that those procedural difficulties would only be implicated in a “small number” of cases).
309. Id. at 289 (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 312–13 (2004)).
310. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[The jury trial] has never been efficient; but it has always been
free.”); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention
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That argument carries weight against the advisory Guidelines adopted by the remedial majority but not against complete invalidation. The argument that the advisory Guidelines
should be adopted instead of the jury-proof Guidelines because
they are more efficient and easier to implement can easily be
trumped by arguing that the advisory Guidelines are a violation of the separation of powers. That argument doesn’t work
against complete invalidation. Because they are on equal constitutional footing, the efficiency and ease of implementation of
the two systems can be directly compared. It is not, however,
the Court’s role to make that decision.
In the end, the differences between the traditional model
and the jury-proof Guidelines—namely, sentencing disparity
and administrative burdens—are matters of public policy that
Congress rather than the judiciary ought to decide. Both alternatives resolve the structural and individual rights concerns.
Constitutionally, the options are indistinguishable. The differences arise in the discussion of disparity and the burdens of
implementation, which are properly within the purview of Congress. Congress must weigh the importance of uniform sentences against the added administrative burdens associated
with retaining the Guidelines. The most the Court can do is
hold the Guidelines unconstitutional and make the acceptable
alternatives clear for Congress. The ultimate decision, however,
must lie in the hands of a politically accountable branch of government.
CONCLUSION
Defendants have attacked, and the Supreme Court has
thoroughly examined, the individual rights implications of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Unfortunately, the Court has
overlooked the parallel structural violation. The unique solution created in Booker and Rita, however, exposed the hidden
separation of powers issue. This Note demonstrates that the
Guidelines are a legislative attempt to control individual sentencing and a legislative exercise of judicial authority in violation of the separation of powers. So long as the Guidelines remain in place, without requiring proof before a jury, they will
take power away from the judiciary and increase the power of
Congress in violation of the separation of powers.
of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”).
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The Court’s sentencing jurisprudence failed to take the separation of powers into account and, as a result, created insufficient remedies to the constitutional problems underlying the
Guidelines. The individual rights analysis derived from the Apprendi line of cases has proven inadequate to deal with the
structural concerns presented by the Guidelines. To fully resolve the constitutional issues, the Court must acknowledge the
separation of powers and incorporate it into the analysis.
That does not mean that the Guidelines must necessarily
be abolished. The Court can present Congress with constitutionally sound alternatives to the Guidelines. Presenting this
choice to Congress would treat the Guidelines in the same way
that the Court has treated prior legislative actions. It is possible for the Court to resolve all of the constitutional issues while
at the same time allowing Congress the flexibility to promote
whichever constitutional policy it so chooses.

